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Abstract: 
I examine a production economy with a financial sector that contains multiple layers of credit. 
Such layers are designed to constitute credit chains which are inclusive of a simple mortgage market. 
The focus is on the nature and contagion properties of credit chains in an economy where the financial 
sector plays a real allocative role and agents have a nontrivial choice of whether to default on 
mortgages or not. Multiple equilibria with different rates of default are observed, due to the presence 
of strategic complementarities. Default can trigger a financial crisis as well as constrain the purchases 
of factors of production, thus leading to potentially serious effects on real activity. 
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Resumen 
Examiné una economía de producción con un sector financiero que contiene múltiples capas 
de crédito. Tales capas están diseñadas para constituir cadenas de crédito las cuales son incluyentes de 
un mercado hipotecario sencillo. La atención se centra en la naturaleza y las propiedades de contagio 
de las cadenas de crédito en una economía donde el sector financiero juega un rol real de asignación 
de recursos y los agentes tienen una elección no trivial ya sea por defecto de las hipotecas o no. 
Equilibrios múltiples con diferentes tasas de incumplimiento son observados, debido a la presencia de 
estrategias complementarias. El incumplimiento puede desencadenar una crisis financiera tan buena 
como limitar las compras de factores de producción, entonces conduce efectos potencialmente serios 
en la actividad real. 
 
 
Introduction 
In this paper, I build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of credit chains in a 
closed-economy payments system that shares the spirit of Freeman (1996, 2001), Hernandez-Verme 
(2004) and Freeman and Hernandez-Verme (2008.) I must point out outright that I do not aim at 
replicating the facts before and after the subprime mortgage crisis. My purpose is humbler: to 
illustrate the presence and functioning of credit chains in the overall structure of a financial system 
where spatial separation is nontrivial. The following innovations in my model are of the utmost 
importance: the presence of a simple mortgage market, the presence of a strategic group of banks who 
are local monopolies in offering deposits and mortgage loans; the double role of the lending sector, 
which is also the productive sector in this economy; the presence of a shock that sizes down (or up) 
the value of the real state at the time when the mortgages are repaid, leading to a nontrivial choice of 
whether to default on mortgages or not. 
 There are three groups of strategic agents that interact in a payments system in this model 
economy: lenders, borrowers and banks. Moreover, one can classify borrowers in two classes in 
equilibrium: borrowers who default on their debt and borrowers who repay their debt. My main 
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underlying hypothesis is that, even in the absence of a house bubble, the structure of the financial 
system itself makes it vulnerable to default, systemic risk and downturns in economic activity. 
Moreover, the analysis of welfare in equilibrium will be shown to defy conventional wisdom in terms 
of who wins and who loses as a result of a crisis in this economy. 
 
 The contributions of this paper with respect to the previous literature can be listed as follows: 
• The presence of a shock that alters the resources available to borrowers66. 
• Borrowers choosing endogenously whether to default or not. 
• The presence of banks that are local monopolies and offer both deposit and mortgage 
contracts. 
• The introduction of a very simple mortgage market in a model of the payment system 
• The linkage between production possibilities and default on debt 
• The presence of strategic complementarities that may lead to the presence of multiple 
equilibria 
 In this model economy, default reduces the resources available to purchase labor, 
subsequently reducing output. There is always a positive rate of default in equilibrium, whether it is 
unique or not. Moreover, universal default and universal repayment cannot obtain in equilibrium due 
to the nature of the shock that continuously hits this economy and the signaling to lenders by 
borrowers, respectively. The equilibrium interest rates on deposits, IOUs and loans display the 
potential for the existence of two equilibria: one with a low rate of default and the other with a high 
rate of default. However, the model so far has not produced any criteria for equilibrium selection 
yet67. I must also point out that, against standard intuition, the bank obtains positive profits only when 
the equilibrium rates of default are sufficiently high; my interpretation of this result is that banks are 
risk lovers in equilibrium. 
 In this model, young borrowers formulate a contingent plan in light of the realization of the 
shock that they will experience the following period. This works through the choice of a cut-off value 
from the distribution of the shock, such that realizations below the cut-off will lead to defaulting while 
realizations above the cut-off will lead to repayment. A crisis in this model takes the form of an 
innovation in such cut-off value of the shock. The main results of the analysis are as follows: 
1. A crisis reduces total output in this economy by reducing the resources available to purchase 
labor. 
2. A crisis also reduces the aggregate welfare of borrowers. However, this effect can be 
misleading, since the borrowers who default experience welfare gains, while the “honest” 
borrowers who choose to repay their debt are made worse-off. Thus, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, the result shows that the borrowers who default do not suffer from this shock and 
that the ones who are in the need of help, probably from government agencies, are the 
“honest” borrowers. 
3. The lenders in this economy (equivalent to the general public who holds deposits on banks) 
experience significant welfare gains as a result of a crisis. This, then, is another sector that is 
not in need of government assistance. 
4. A crisis increases the bank’s income but reduces its costs, thus increasing the bank’s profits in 
equilibrium. This result seems to go against conventional wisdom, but remember that there 
are no investment banks in this model nor mortgage backed securities. This is consistent with 
the fact that commercial banks seem to be doing reasonable well in light of the subprime 
mortgage crisis. 
 Finally, I would like to mention that my initial intentions included the examination of 
alternative Liquidity Saving Mechanisms (LSM) and alternative rules for the settlement of debt as 
well, but, due to my time constraint, this has not been incorporated into the model yet. 
                                                          
66 This is an improvement on Freeman and Hernandez-Verme (2008,) that used a location-specific utility shock. 
67 This is mostly due to my time constraint, but I will be working on this subject next. 
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The Environment 
 Consider a model closed economy consists of one central settlement location and 2I >  
triplets of outer islands, indexed by 1,2,...i I= . Time is discrete and indexed by 1,2,...t=  . All 
strategic agents are overlapping generations that live for 2-periods, and population is constant. 
Throughout the paper, I assume that all contracts are enforceable when on the Central Island, but not 
on the outer islands. There is a fiat currency that circulates in this economy. For simplicity, I will label 
this currency as dollars. 
 In this model economy, each date has two parts: morning and afternoon, and 
transactions/actions take place sequentially in each of them. All strategic agents must travel to the 
central island in the morning of their old age, where contracts can be enforced. On the central island, 
clearing and settlement of debt will take place through a third party, which I will interchangeably call 
throughout the centralized settlement institution or monetary authority. 
The Main Actors 
 There are three groups of strategic agents in each triplet i . There is a continuum of borrowers 
with unit mass on the first island of the triplet, which I will call Borrowers i , and a continuum of 
Lenders also with a unit mass on the second island of the triplet, which I will call Lenders i . Finally, 
there is a monopolistic bank on the third island of the triplet, which I will call Bank i . 
 There is also a nonstrategic agent on the central island that I will call the monetary authority, 
which is also the central settlement institution. Each bank must create a reserve account with the 
monetary authority. 
The Goods 
 There are five goods in this economy. First, Lenders i  have an endowment good when young. 
The size of this endowment is 0,x i> ∀ , but this good is island-specific, with a price of i
t
p  dollars per 
good at date t . Second, Lenders i  can produce a final good when old. This good is also island-
specific, and its price at date t  is i
t
θ  dollars per good. 
 In the third place, young Borrowers i  have an endowment good in the amount ( )0,1y∈ . This 
good is also island-specific, and it is attachable as down-payment for a house in Banks i  in the 
following way: y  is the fraction of the value of a house that Borrowers i  can put as a down-payment 
when young. This good is not otherwise traded. 
 Fourthly, Bank i  is endowed with 0z>  of an agent- and triplet-specific good. Bank i  can 
only use this good to partially finance mortgage loans to young Borrowers i  at the price i
t
µ . This 
good is not traded otherwise. 
 The last “good” in this economy is labor. Young borrowers in island i  are endowed with one 
unit of non storable labor. Labor is homogeneous across agents and islands, and it is traded for the 
nominal wage 
t
w  in the afternoon of date t . 
The Assets 
 There are six different assets in this economy. In the first place, we have the debt (IOUs) 
issued by Borrowers i  to Lenders 1i + , so that the former can purchase the endowment good of the 
latter. The associated promised real gross interest rate 1
1
i
t
r +
+
 is set on triplet 1i+  at date t  by young 
lenders. This loan must be repaid next period using fiat money. 
 Secondly, there is a fixed stock I  of identical houses, such that there is one house per each 
Borrower. In each triplet, there is a continuum of houses with unit mass that is located in the 
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Borrowers’ island. The price of a house in triplet i  is i
t
q  dollars at date t . Houses do not depreciate, 
other than for a shock that we will discuss in the next section. 
 Third, young Lenders i  can accumulate physical capital by investing when young. This 
investment technology will yield as much capital at 1t+  as it was invested at t . Capital is island-
specific and it depreciates completely after production, and I will denote it by 1
i
tK + . In the fourth 
place, there is fiat money issued by the monetary authority, and 
t
M  denotes the nominal money 
supply at date t . Fiat money is used to purchase labor, to pay mortgages in full, to settle IOUs and to 
purchase the Lender i ’s final good. The return on real money balances between dates t  and 1t+  is 
given by ( )
1t t
w w
+
. 
 The fifth asset consists of mortgage contracts issued by Bank i  to Borrowers i . The promised 
real gross interest rate set at date t  by the bank is 
1
i
t
ρ
+
, and mortgages must be repaid in full with fiat 
money the next period. Finally, young Lenders i  can also make deposits in the monopolistic Bank i  
in the amount i
t
d  at date t . The promised real gross interest rate on deposits set by the bank at date t  
is 
1
i
t
R
+
, which is paid at date 1t+ . 
Uncertainty 
 In this economy, all Borrowers i  are ex ante identical. However, they expect a shock to be 
realized at the beginning of their old age. This shock will affect the amount of real state held by old 
borrowers in that it can reduce or increase the value of individual real state, but leaves the aggregate 
real state unchanged. I will denote the realization of the shock to household j  in triplet i  at date t  by 
,i j
t
λ . However, I will drop the subscript and supra-scripts in the remainder of this section in order to 
simplify both notation and explanation. 
 I let λ  denote the shock, which represents the fraction of the house that is left to borrowers in 
the morning when old. This shock is i.i.d.-distributed over borrower households, triplets and time. I 
use ( )g λ  to denote the stationary p.d.f. of the shock, while ( )G λ  denotes the associated c.d.f. The 
support set of this shock is given by ,
L H
λ λ   , where I assume that [ )0,1Lλ ∈  and 1Hλ > . Henceforth, 
for tractability, I will assume λ  has a uniform distribution. Thus, ( ) 1
H L
g λ
λ λ
=
−
 and 
( )
H L
G
λ
λ
λ λ
=
−
. The distribution of the shock is public information, but not its individual 
realization, which will be known only to the individual borrower. 
 The variable λ  is a multiplicative shock that alters the resources available to old borrowers. 
The old borrower must pay ( )
1
1i i
t t
q yρ
+
⋅ ⋅ −  dollars to the bank early in the morning of date 1t+  to 
repay her mortgage in full, but her resources are scaled down (or up) to ( )
1 1
1i i
t t t
q yλ ρ
+ +
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − . Before she 
sells the house, she must repair it, incurring in a cost of ( )
1 1
1 i
t t
qλ
+ +
− ⋅  dollars 
1
1
t
λ
+
∀ ≤ , to bring the 
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house back to its original condition68. Next, she sells the house for 
1
i
t
q
+
, obtaining the net the profit 
1 1
i
t t
qλ
+ +
⋅ . In case the borrower defaults, the bank seizes the house and it must make the same repairs 
before selling it. 
 Young borrowers anticipate this, but not the particular realization of 
1t
λ
+
, and they form a 
contingent plan in which they choose a cut-off value λ of the shock from the support of the 
distribution, such that ,
L H
λ λ λ∈  
 . In particular, borrower households will repay their mortgage 
when the realization of the shock is such that 
1t H
λ λ λ
+
≤ ≤ , while they will default when 
1L t
λ λ λ
+
≤ <   
obtains. As we will see later, a choice of repaying or defaulting on a mortgage is, at the same time, a 
choice of repaying or defaulting on IOU: all these transactions must take place on the central island 
and if the borrower chooses to repay her IOU, it must also repay her mortgage. 
 Default is also costly to borrowers in utility terms. Old borrowers may consume (use) their 
houses when old in the afternoon: { }
1
0,1 , , 0i
t
h i t
+
= ∀ > . 
1
1i
t
h
+
=  only when the mortgage has been repaid 
in full, but 
1
0i
t
h
+
=  if they default on the mortgage, and they must forego the utility of the house they 
bought the previous date. 
 The stock of houses left in a particular triplet after the shocks are realized and before the 
houses are repaired is given by ( ) ( ) ( )2 1
H
L
H L
g d
λ
λ
λ λ λ λ λ⋅ ⋅ = + ≤ ≥∫ . After the repairs, the stock of 
houses per triplet goes back to ( )
1
0
1 1dj=∫ . 
 One can also calculate the probability of default in a particular island by using the Law of 
Large Numbers. Let 
1
i
t
π
+
 denote the probability of default on a particular triplet. Then, 
( ) ( ) ( )
1
L
H L
i
t
g d G
λ
λ
λ λ λπ λ λ λ
+
−= ⋅ = =∫

 . The reader may notice that I keep the supra-script i  on the 
rate of default, since there is a potential for multiple equilibria in this economy. The promised interest 
rates will be reduced by the factor ( )11 itπ +−  in equilibrium. 
Endowments of the Agents in Triplet i  
 Lenders. Lenders are endowed with 0x >  units each of their endowment good when young, 
which is island-specific and it non storable. They are also endowed with an investment technology 
that allows them to accumulate physical capital when young. This technology is island-specific and 
not transferable, and so is the capital. 
 When old, lenders are endowed with a technology that allows them to produce an island-
specific final good, for which they need to utilize physical capital and labor to produce the specific 
final good i  when old, for which they need physical capital and labor. This technology is island-
specific and not transferable. Lenders have no other endowment when old. 
 Borrowers. Young borrowers are endowed with ( )0,1y∈ , where y  represents the fraction 
of the value of a house they can put as down payment. This endowment good is island-specific and 
                                                          
68 Notice that when (
1
1,
t H
λλ
+
∈  , the borrower is entitled to a profit in the order of ( )1 11
i
t t
qλ
+ +
− ⋅  dollars. 
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only attachable as a down-payment for a house. In addition, they are endowed with a technology to 
issue IOUs to Lenders from island 1i + , which is island-specific and not transferable as well. Finally, 
also when young, borrowers are endowed with one unit of non storable labor, which is homogeneous 
across agents and borrowers. Borrowers have no endowment when old. 
 The Bank. When young, the bank is endowed with 0z >  units of and endowment good, 
which will be used to partially finance mortgages. The young bank has a monopoly on the following 
two activities in triplet i : first, they can offer deposit contracts from young lenders, and, second, they 
can package mortgage contracts to be offered to young borrowers. These last activities are island-
specific and non transferable. The bank has no endowments when old. 
 The Initial Old. At the initial date, 0t= , there is a generation of initial old agents in each 
triplet i  with the same size as the regular generation born at date 0t≥ . They hold the initial supplies 
of assets in this economy. Thus, the initial old borrowers hold the endowment of houses in each 
triplet, given by 1I I = . The initial money supply (the monetary base) is distributed equally among 
triplets in the amount of ( )
0 0
m M I≡  dollars. The money supply in a particular triplet is distributed 
proportionately to initial old lenders and the initial old bank. Notice that the latter implies I  
endogenous initial conditions, summarized by { }
0 0 1
Ii
i
m p
=
. Finally, the initial stock of capital in triplet 
i  is given by 
0
iK , which is distributed equally among initial old lenders. The latter implies I  
exogenous initial conditions, which are summarized by { }
0 1
Ii
i
K
=
. 
 
Monetary Policy and Aggregate Money Supply 
 The monetary policy in this model economy is very simple. For now, I assume that supply of 
high power money is constant, such that 
0
, 0
t
M M t= ∀ ≥ . In addition, the I  banks in this economy 
must hold domestic currency reserves with the central bank, where [ ]0,1φ∈  denotes the fraction of 
deposits that each bank must hold each period. Moreover, in this model economy, banks give loans to 
young borrowers, who use them to purchase houses. Thus, the aggregate money supply in public 
hands at date t  is given by 
0
1
I
i i
t t t
i
M M p dφ
=
= − ⋅ ⋅∑  dollars. Notice that there is no secondary money 
creation role played by banks, since those funds are already allocated into the purchase of houses and 
do not circulate into the economy again. 
Markets for Houses and Factors of Production 
 The characterization of the market for houses is very simple. There are I  triplet-specific 
markets for houses in which young borrowers buy a house each either from old borrowers or the bank. 
The depiction of the markets for factors of production is very simple as well. In the first place, there is 
an integrated market for labor: labor is homogeneous across triplets, and young workers can work on 
any triplet they choose. The price of labor is the nominal wage at date t , given by 
t
w , and the 
relevant measure of the real wage is given by ( )1it tw p + . On the other hand, there are I  island-
specific markets for capital, since only 0i
t
K >  can be used by old lenders i  to produce their island-
specific final good at date t . 
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Preferences and Actions 
 In this section, I discuss the preferences and potential choices of each of the three types of 
strategic agents, as well as the problem they each solve. The focus is on a typical generation born at 
triplet i  at date t . Recall that the composition of each generation is constant over time: there are 
lenders, borrowers and one bank which will interact not only with each other, but also with either 
agent from other triplets as well as with agents from other generations. 
The Lender from Triplet i  
 All lenders from triplet i  are ex-ante identical. Each lender wishes to consume the final good 
i  that they produce when old in the amount 
2, 1
i
t
l
+
 in the afternoon. When young, she allocates her 
endowment good as follows. First, early in the morning, she sells part of her endowment to young 
borrowers from island 1i −  in exchange for IOUs in the amount of i
t
s  dollars. Second, still in the 
morning, she deposits i
t
d  units of her endowment in Bank i . Finally, before the end of the morning, 
she invests the remainder of her endowment into physical capital, such that 
1
i
t
K
+
 goods invested at 
date t  will yield 
1
i
t
K
+
 units of capital in the afternoon at date 1t + . 
1
i
t
K
+
 will be used at date 1t+ , 
together with labor, to produce the final good. The details of the lender’s time line are presented in 
Figure 1 below. 
 
 
  
In the morning of the next period, all lenders must travel to the central island in order to get 
the repayment of their IOUs from borrowers and the return of their deposits from the bank. Next, in 
the afternoon, each old lender uses the return on her deposits and the payment of the IOUs she holds 
to purchase labor. She also sells part of the final good she will produce to old borrowers from island 
2i I−  in exchange for 
1
i
t
m
+
  dollars, and uses these proceeds to purchase labor as well. Next, before 
the end of the afternoon, the old lender produces her triplet-specific final good using the technology 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1
1 1 1 1 1
, , 0,1i i i
t t t t t
f F K L K L
α α
α
−
+ + + + +
= = ⋅ ∈ , and consume part of it in the amount 
2, 1
i
t
l
+
. 
 The preferences of a lender from island i  born at date t  are given by 
a.m. p.m. a.m. p.m. 
Date t Date t+1 
Figure 1: Time Line for Lenders in Triplet i  born at date t  
Receive 
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m
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( ) ( )2, 1 2, 1lni it tu l l+ +=  (1), 
while her budget constraints are given by 
1
i
i it
i t t
t
s
x d K
p +
= + +
 
 
 
 
, (2a) 
( )
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
i
i i i i i it
it t t t t t t t
t
s
p R d r m w L
p
π
+ + + + + + +
− ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + = ⋅
  
  
    
 , (2b) 
( ) ( )112, 1 1 1 1
1
i
i i it
it t t t
t
m
l f K L
α α
θ
−
+
+ + + +
+
+ = = ⋅

. (2c) 
 Thus, the problem of a young lender from triplet i  is given by 
( ) ( )1 1
1 1
11
1
, ,
ln  
i
i t
it t
i i
tit t
it
t t
s m
dp
m
K LMax
α α
θ
θ
−
+
+ +
++
+
⋅ −
 
 
  

, (3a) 
subject to: 
1
i
i it
it t
t
s
K x d
p+
= − −  (3b) 
( ) 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 11
1
i i i i
i i i it t t t
i it t t t t
t tt t
p s m
L r R d
w wp
θ
π
θ
+ + +
+ + + +
+ ++
= − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
        
        
                

, (3c) 
 taking 
1
i
t
π
+
 and all prices as given. Notice that the proceeds from deposits and IOUs are scaled 
down by the rate of default 
1
i
t
π
+
. As a result, the necessary first order conditions for this problem, 
assuming an interior solution, are summarized by 
( )1 1
1 1
11
1
1
i
i it t
i t t
tt
L p
r
wK
α
π
α
+ +
+ +
++
⋅ = − ⋅ ⋅
−
                  
, (4a) 
( )1 1
1 1
11
1
1
i
i it t
i t t
tt
L p
R
wK
α
π
α
+ +
+ +
++
⋅ = − ⋅ ⋅
−
                  
, (4b) 
( ) 1 1
1 1
1
i
t t
i
t t
K w
L
α
α
θ
+ +
+ +
− ⋅ =
 
 
 
 
. (4c) 
 Equivalently, (4c) can be rewritten as ( )
1 1 1
i i
t t t
MPL w θ
+ + +
= , which illustrates the fact that 
labor paid according to its marginal product. Notice as well that (4a) together with (4b) imply that 
there is no arbitrage between IOUs and deposits, and, thus, the following condition must hold for an 
interior solution: 
( )
( )
1 11
1 1
1 1
1 1
i
i i t tt
i it t
t t
w pL
r R
K
α
α π
+ ++
+ +
+ +
= = ⋅
− −
                
 (4d) 
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The Borrower j  from Triplet i  
 All borrowers [ ]0,1j∈  in island i  are identical in every respect but for the realization of the 
shock that will hit them in the following date. The realizations of this shock are borrower and triplet-
specific and its distribution is common knowledge. Each borrower knows that the shock will hit them 
next period, but they do not know what its realization will be at the moment when they are making 
their choices. Then, all borrowers must formulate choose a contingent plan that will be adjusted 
depending on the realization of the shock. In addition, I assume that borrowers do not have a bequest 
motive, so they must sell their houses before they die. The details of the borrower’s time line are 
presented in the figure below. 
 
 
  
Young borrowers from island i  wish to consume 
1,
i
t
c  units of Lenders 1i+ ’s endowment good 
when young in the morning of date t . Since they have nothing of value to offer to lenders at this time, 
they issue an IOU of value 1
1,
i i i
t t t
b p c+= ⋅  dollars to be re-paid using fiat money in the morning of 1t+  
on the Central Island, with the promised interest rate 1
1
i
t
r +
+
. At this time, they also sign a mortgage 
contract with Bank i , where this Bank requires a promised real gross interest rate 
1
i
t
ρ
+
. Obviously, 
houses are an indivisible good, and they can buy only one house. The mortgage contract requires 
young borrowers from island i  to make the down payment i
t
D for a house when young in the 
morning, in the amount i i
t t
D q y= ⋅  dollars. Finally, at this point of time, they also choose the cut-off 
value λ  from the distribution of shocks, in the manner described in sub-section 2.4. In the afternoon, 
young borrowers sell their labor. They work for either old lenders or old banks on any island in 
exchange for the nominal wage 
t
w . By this point in time, the choices of 
1,
i
t
c , ( )1i i
t t
b p + , i
t
D  and the 
supply of labor are already inelastic. 
 First thing in the morning of the following period, the borrower j  from triplet i  is in her old 
age, and she learns her individual realization of the shock, ,
1
i j
t
λ
+
. Regardless of the particular 
a.m. p.m. a.m. p.m. 
Date t Date t+1 
Figure 2: Time Line for Borrowers in Triplet i  born at date t  
Receive 
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ent  y 
Issue 
IO
U
 b
t i  
Pay dow
n 
paym
ent D
it  
Consum
e lender’s 
good c
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m
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Do not travel to 
Central Island, no 
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Consume lender’s good, 
don’t enjoy house 
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realization of the shock and of whether the mortgage will be repaid or not, the house must be rebuilt 
before it is sold again later in the morning, incurring in a cost of ( ),
1 1
1 i k i
t t
qλ
+ +
− ⋅  dollars. Next, based 
upon this realization, the borrower decides whether or not to pay the remainder of their mortgage. 
Recall that all repayments must be made on the Central Island, using fiat money. Thus, if a particular 
borrower chooses not to repay her mortgage, she cannot repay her IOUs either, since she would get 
caught once she is on the Central Island. Moreover, if the borrower defaults, she cannot enjoy the 
house ( ),
1
0i j
t
h
+
=  or sell it later, since the house goes to the bank. In this respect, then, the choice of 
whether or not to default is also a choice of enjoying their house or not when old. Later, in the 
afternoon, the borrower would like to purchase the final good produced by old lenders in island 
2i I+  and consume it, implying a cost of 2
1 2, 1
i I i
t t
cθ +
+ +
⋅  dollars. She must pay for this good at the time of 
the transaction using fiat money, and she can do this regardless of her choice of whether or not to 
default, since nobody knows her in island 2i I+ , nor they care about her having repaid all her debt or 
not. 
 Let me discuss briefly how borrowers implement their contingent plans. Each old borrower j  
learns her individual realization of the shock, 
,
1
i j
t
λ
+
, and she compares it against her chosen cut-off 
value λ . On the one hand, if ,
1
i j
t
λ λ
+
<  , the borrower decides that is not in her best interest to repay her 
mortgage and IOUs. Instead, she can take her money balances with her and run away to island 2i I+  
to purchase the old lender’s final good, but 
1
0i
t
h
+
=  and her house goes back to the bank, which has to 
rebuild it before selling it. On the other hand, if ,
1
i j
t
λ λ
+
≥  , the borrower repays her mortgage in full for 
( )
1
1i i
t t
q yρ
+
⋅ ⋅ −  dollars, and repays her IOU for ( )1 1
1 1
1i i
t t
i i
t t
p r b p+ +
+ +
+⋅ ⋅  dollars. Next, she enjoys the house 
( )
1
1i
t
h
+
=  and she rebuilds whatever was destroyed by the shock ( ),
1 1
1 i k i
t t
qλ
+ +
− ⋅  dollars69, then selling it 
for 
1
i
t
q
+
. Finally, in the afternoon, she travels to island 2i I+  to purchase the old lender’s final good. 
 The lifetime utility of a borrower is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ),1, 2, 1 1 1 1, 2, 1 1, , , ln lni i i i j i i it t t t t t tu c c h c c hλ+ + + + += + + ,  (5) 
while the budget constraints faced by a young borrower are: 
11,
i
i t
it
t
b
c
p +
=
 
 
 
 
, (6a) 
i i
t t
D q y= ⋅  (6b) 
i
t t t t t t
m w w L w a= = ⋅ + ⋅   (6c) 
 For starters, an old borrower who chooses not to default (i.e., when ,
1
i j
t
λ λ
+
≥   obtains) will face 
the following constraints 
                                                          
69 When 
,
1
1
i j
t
λ
+
> , the borrower will experience an equity gain instead in the amount of ( ),
1 1
1
i j i
t t
qλ
+ +
− ⋅ . 
1st Annual International Interdisciplinary Conference, AIIC 2013, 24-26 April, Azores, Portugal               - Proceedings- 
 
129 
 
( ), , 11 12 2 2 1 22, 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1
i i i i
i j i j i it t t t t
i I i I i I i i It t t t
t t t t t
w q p b q
c r y
p
λ ρ
θ θ θ θ
++ +
+ + + + ++ + + +
+ + + +
= + ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ −
         
         
         
         
 , (7a) 
,
1
1i j
t
h
+
= ,  (7b). 
 Secondly, an old borrower who chooses to default (i.e., when ,
1
i j
t
λ λ
+
<   obtains) faces the 
following two constraints instead 
,
22, 1
1
i j t
i It
t
w
c
θ
++
+
= , (8a) 
,
1
0i j
t
h
+
= .  (8b) 
 Thus, the problem that Borrower j  from triplet i  must solve is 
( ) ( ) ( )1, 2, 1 2, 1
1, 2, 1 2, 1
, , ,
  ln + ln ln 1
H
L
i i i
t t t
i i i
t t t
c c c
c c d c dMax
λλ
λ λλ
λ λ
+ +
+ +
⋅ + + ⋅  ∫ ∫

  
   (9a) 
s.t. (6a), (7a), (7b), (8a), (8b), 
L H
λ λ λ≤ ≤ , (9b) 
 and taking all prices as given. After integrating by parts and using change of variable, we can 
rewrite this problem as the maximization, by choosing ( )1i it tb p +  and λ , of the following objective 
function70 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 21, 2, 1 2, 1
1
2, 1 2, 1
, , , ln
ln ln
i
i i i t t
i i It t t L
t t
i i
t H H t
b w
u c c c
p
c A c A
λ λ λ
θ
λ λ λ λ
+ ++ +
+
+ +
= + − ⋅
+ ⋅ − ⋅
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
, (10a) 
where: 
( ) ( ) 11 12 2 2 2 12, 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1
i i i i
i i it t t t t
i I i I i I i I it H H t t
t t t t t
w q q p b
c y r
p
λ λ ρ
θ θ θ θ
++ +
+ + + + ++ + +
+ + + +
≡ + ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅
         
         
         
         
 , (10b) 
( ) ( ) 11 12 2 2 2 12, 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1
i i i i
i i it t t t t
i I i I i I i I it t t
t t t t t
w q q p b
c y r
p
λ λ ρ
θ θ θ θ
++ +
+ + + + ++ + +
+ + + +
≡ + ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅
         
         
         
         
   , (10c) 
( )
( ) 1 1
11 1
1 1 1
1
i i i
i it t t t
i i i it t
t t t t
w q y p b
A r
q q q p
ρ
+ +
++ +
+ + +
⋅ −
♠ ≡ ♠+ − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅
            
           
. (10d) 
 Of course, the condition (9b) must also hold. A couple of observations will become useful 
later on. First, 
2, 1
i
t
c
+
  and ( )A ⋅  are increasing in λ . Second, 
2 11 tt
A c qθ
++
= is positive. Next, I 
proceed to discuss and evaluate the first order conditions for this problem. 
                                                          
70 For details, see the Technical Appendix. 
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 The first order condition with respect to ( )1i it tb p +  is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
1
1 1
1 2, 1 2, 1
1
1 ln ln 0
i i
i it t
ii i t H t
tt t
r p
c c
qb p
λ λ
+
+ +
+ + +
+
⋅
− ⋅ − ≥      
   . (11a) 
 To discuss the properties of the borrower’s solution for ( )1i it tb p + , we must evaluate different 
possibilities using (11a). I use a simple fixed point technique71. The results show that ( )*/ 0b p >  does 
exist and it is unique, with some qualifications. First, ( )*b p  does not exist for 
L
λ λ= . Second, 
( ) ( )*
1M H t t
b p wλ λ θ
+
∃ ≤ = . 
 The first order condition with respect to λ  is given by 
( )
2, 1 2, 1
1 ln
i i
t t
c c λ
+ +
− −   
   . (11b) 
 The expression in (11b) requires additional examination. First, notice that ( )22, 1 1i i It t tc w θ ++ +=  
is independent of λ  from the standpoint of the borrower and, thus, we can treat it as fixed for now. 
Second, the expression in (11b) is positive when 
L
λ λ= , implying that the latter is not a solution. 
Third, the expression in (11b) decreases with λ . Two cases may arise, based on the particular value 
that 
H
λ  may take: when 
H
λ  is sufficiently low, 
*
H
λ λ=  is a corner solution, while when 
H
λ  is large 
enough, 
*
H
λ λ<  is an interior solution. The two cases are depicted in the diagrams below. 
 
                                                          
71 For details, see the Technical Appendix. 
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corner solution
λL λH
Case 1: Corner Solution
λ
( ),u λ⋅ 
interior solution
λL λH
Case 2: Interior Solution
λ
( ),u λ⋅ 
 
 I now proceed to evaluate the expression in (11b) for different potential values of 
,
L H
λ λ λ∈  
 . 
 Universal Repayment. When 
L
λ λ= , the borrower would choose to always repay. Obviously, 
it must be the case that ( ) ( )22, 1 1i i It L t tc wλ λ θ ++ += >  . The latter implies that the following condition 
must hold 
( ) ( )
*
1 1 1
1
1 1
1
0
i i i i i
t t t t t
i i iL L L
t t t
y q r p b
q q p
ρ
λ λ λ+ + +
+
+ +
⋅ − ⋅ ⋅
> ≡ + ⋅ >
   
   
   
   
 (12a) 
 for 
L
λ λ=  to be a solution to this problem. Obviously, this is not the case when 0,
L L
λ λ∈   , 
implying that 
L
λ λ=  cannot be a solution when the potential negative effects of the shock are 
significantly large. As an example, when borrowers know that their house can be totally destroyed by 
the shock, some positive mass of them will choose not to repay. The latter is consistent with my 
previous examination of (11b) that states that 
L
λ λ=  is not a solution. 
 Universal Default. Suppose now that 
H
λ λ= . In this case, the borrower chooses never to 
repay, and it must be the case that ( ) ( )22, 1 1i i It H t tc wλ λ θ ++ += <  . The preceding inequality leads to the 
following condition 
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( ) ( )
*
11 1
11
1 1
1i i i i
it t t t
i i iH H t H
t t t
q y p b
r
q q p
ρ
λ λ λ++ +
++
+ +
⋅ ⋅ −
< ≡ + ⋅ ⋅
   
   
      
, (12b) 
 which must hold for 
H
λ λ=  to be a solution. Condition (12b) means that, for values of 
H
λ  
that are sufficiently low, *
H
λ λ=  is a solution, which is illustrated in Case 1. However, for values of 
H
λ  that are high enough, i.e. for values such that 
H H
λ λ≥ , 
H
λ λ=  is not the solution, but instead 
L H
λ λ λ< <  is the interior solution for this problem. The latter can be explained by the fact when 
borrowers know that the equity in their houses can increase significantly, a positive mass of them will 
choose to repay in order to rip-off these benefits. 
 Some Default. Finally, consider again the case of the interior solution such that 
( )* ,
L H
λ λ λ∈ . In this case, ( )
2, 1 2, 1
i i
t t
c cλ
+ +
=   must hold, implying that *λ  must satisfy the following 
condition 
( )
( )1 1 11
1 1
* *
1i i i i
it t t t
i i it
t t t
q y p b
r
q q p
ρ
λ λ+ +
++
+ +
⋅ ⋅ −
= + ⋅ ⋅
   
         
  . (12c) 
The Bank from Triplet i  
 The Bank in triplet i  is a monopoly and she starts with zero reserves when young. She 
packages and offers deposit contracts to young lenders and mortgage contracts to young borrowers. In 
addition, the bank must hold currency reserves from t  to 1t+ : a fraction ( )0,1φ∈  of the dollar-value 
of the young lenders’ deposits. Let i
t
χ  denote the amount of dollar-reserves held in the reserves 
account in the monetary authority. Figure 3 below illustrates the details of the bank’s time line. 
 
 
  
Deposit contracts. The Bank offers deposits contracts to young lenders born on triplet i . 
Each young lender must deposit 
i i
t t
p d⋅  dollars early in the morning of date t , and keep them in the 
a.m. p.m. a.m. p.m. 
Date t Date t+1 
Figure 3: Time Line for Bank in Triplet i  born at date t  
Receive 
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m
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bank until the afternoon of date 1t + . In turn, the Bank promises the real gross interest rate 
1
i
t
R
+
 per 
unit of deposits, to be paid in the afternoon of date 1t + . The Bank has the monopoly in triplet i  in 
offering these deposit contracts. The return on deposits will be paid to the lenders once they are on the 
central island, at the same time the mortgages are repaid. 
 Mortgage contracts. Young lenders would like buy a house worth 
i
t
q  in the morning of date 
t . They aim at borrowing from the Bank for this purpose. The mortgage contract specifies the 
following: 1) the young lender must put a down payment of 
i i
t t
D y q= ⋅  dollars. The bank lends the 
remainder ( )1 i
t t
y qΛ = − ⋅  dollars and it purchases the house. The lenders must repay 
( )
1 1
1
i i i
t t t t
y qρ ρ
+ +
⋅ Λ = ⋅ − ⋅  dollars in the morning of date 1t + , after which they own the house and 
they can sell it after repairing it at the price 
1
i
t
q
+
. In the case of default, the Bank i  appropriates the 
house instead, and she can sell it after making the repairs also at the price 
1
i
t
q
+
. Of course, 
1
i
t
ρ
+
 
denotes the real gross interest rate on loans set by the Bank. It is worth pointing out that the Bank has 
the monopoly in pooling the resources available, given by her endowment good and the fraction 
( )1 φ−  of the deposits in her vaults, and this must also be feasible. While the mortgage contract is 
signed at the Bank, all repayments must take place on the Central Island in the morning of date 1t + . 
 With respect to her preferences, the Bank wishes to consume 
1
i
t
a
+
 units of services when old 
in the afternoon. Such services are produced only by the Bank, one-to-one, from labor purchased. 
Obviously, ( )
1 1 1
i i
t t t
w p a
+ + +
⋅  denotes Bank i ’s real cost of purchasing 
1
0
i
t
a
+
>  units of services. Her 
utility function takes the following form: 
( ) ( )
1 1
lni i
t t
u a a
+ +
= , (13) 
while the Bank’s budget constraints are given by 
( )1i i i i i
t t t t t
z p d q yµ χ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ − +  (14a) 
i i i
t t t
p dχ φ= ⋅ ⋅ .  (14b) 
 Combining (14a) and (14b), I obtain 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1
1 1
1 1 1
2 2
1
1
1
2
i i i i i
i it t t t t
t H t
t t t
i
L t
t
q y p d
a R
w w w
q
w
ρ χ
λ λ
λ λ
+ +
+ +
+ + +
+
+
⋅ ⋅ − ⋅
= + − ⋅ − ⋅ +
     − ⋅
    
    ⋅      


. (14c) 
 I now can express the Bank’s problem as a constrained profit-maximization 
( )
1
1 1,
 ln i
ti i
t tR
aMax
ρ
+
+ +
 
   s.t. (14c,) 
 taking , ,
L H
λ λ λ  and all other prices as given. The first order conditions of this problem with 
respect to 
1
i
t
R
+
 and 
1
i
t
ρ
+
 are, respectively, 
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1 1
0
i i
t t
i
t t
p d
a w
+ +
⋅
− <
⋅
 (15a) 
( ) ( )
1 1
1
0
i
t
iH
t t
q y
a w
λ λ
+ +
⋅ −
− ⋅ >
⋅
 
 
 
 
 . (15b) 
 On the one hand, the condition in (15a) implies a left-corner solution for 
1
i
t
R
+
, i.e. the Bank 
will pay the lowest interest rate on deposits that lenders would be willing to accept, which I will 
denote by 
1
ˆ i
t
R
+
. In this case, we can obtain 
1
ˆ i
t
R
+
 from equation (4d), such that  
( ) ( )
( )
1 1
1 1
1 1
ˆ ˆ
1
i i t t H L
i it t
Ht t
L w
R r
K p
α λ λ
λ λ
λ λα
+ +
+ +
+ +
⋅ ⋅ −
= = ⋅
−− ⋅ ⋅
 
 
 
 
 
 , (16a) 
where it is apparent that ( )
1
ˆ i
t
R λ
+
  is increasing in λ , from the Bank’s standpoint. 
 On the other hand, the condition in (15b) indicates that the Bank will charge the maximum 
possible interest rate on loans that would be acceptable by borrowers who will not default. This 
interest rate 
1
ˆ
i
t
ρ
+
 will be such that ( ) ( )22, 1 2, 1 1 1i i i It t t tc c wλ θ ++ + + += =   obtains. Using equation (10c), one 
can solve for 
1
ˆ
i
t
ρ
+
 and obtain the following 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 1 1
11
ˆ
ˆ
1 1
i i i i
i t t t t
i i it
t t t
q R p b
q y q y p
λ λ
ρ λ + + +
++
⋅ ⋅
= − ⋅
⋅ − ⋅ −
 
 . (16b) 
 However, it is unclear whether the equilibrium interest rate on loans increases with λ  or not. 
To summarize, equations (16a) and (16b) represent the Bank’s profit-maximizing choices. 
General Equilibrium 
 In this section, I summarize the conditions that must hold in a general equilibrium. I proceed 
by blocks. First, I present the four conditions related to the financial and asset markets. The market for 
IOUs must clear at date t , which happens when  
( )
1i i
t t
i i
t t
s b
p p
λ
−
=   (17a) 
for all t  and i . Next, the market for mortgages clears at t  when  
( ) ( )1 1i i i i
t t t t
z p d q yµ φ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ − , (17b) 
while the markets for money and for reserves clear, respectively, when 
0
1
I
i i
t t t t
i
M M p d I wφ
=
= − ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅∑  (17c) 
i i
t t t
p dφ χ⋅ ⋅ = .  (17d) 
 Secondly, I present the markets for factors of production. The market for labor at date t  clears 
when 
1
I
i
t t
i
I L a I
=
⋅ + =∑   (18) 
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 holds, and, due to the particular structural characteristics of capital creation, the market for 
physical capital always clears. 
 In the third place, I present the conditions for the different markets for goods. The market for 
the lender’s endowment good clears when 
( )
1
1
i
i it
it t
t
b
x K d
p
λ
−
+
= + +  (19a) 
is satisfied, while the market for the lender’s final good clears when 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
21 1 2, 1
1
1
12
11 1 1 1 1
ˆˆ 1
H
i i t
i It t t
t
i
i I i i i i i t
it t t t t t
t
w
K L l
b
q q y R d
p
α α
λ
λ
θ
θ λ ρ λ λ λ λ
−
+
++ + +
+
−
−+
++ + + + +
= +
+ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∫

 
 (19b) 
 Now, I turn to discuss the properties of some of the key variables in the model in a symmetric 
equilibrium. 
A Symmetric General Equilibrium 
 In this model economy, the structure at heart has been designed so that the agents that belong 
to a particular type but were born in different triplets face the same problem and the same conditions 
but for the individual realizations of the shock that affects old borrowers. In comes naturally, then, to 
pay attention to a symmetric equilibrium. 
 A symmetric equilibrium is defined as one in which all triplet-specific variables 
i
x  are equal 
to their counterparts from all other triplets ,
j
x j i≠ . For example, 
1 1
,
i
t t
iλ λ
+ +
= ∀  , and so on, with the 
exception of the realizations of individual-specific shocks. This exercise will allow me to point out the 
potential for strategic complementarities that underlies this economy. 
 The reader will notice that the main equilibrium quantities and interest rates are a function of 
λ  in equilibrium. In what follows, I describe the properties of the gains/losses of the different agents 
in equilibrium when there is an innovation in λ . 
Labor Purchases by Old Lenders and Total Output 
 In equilibrium, I obtain that there is no closed-form solution for the labor purchases by old 
lenders ( )
1t
L λ
+
 . Moreover, ( )
1t
L λ
+
  is properly defined iff 
1t
K xα
+
< ⋅ 72. The following equation 
defines implicitly the labor purchases by old lenders  
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
2
1 1
1
1 1 1
1
1 12
t t H
t
t t tH L
x K q
L
K L K
αα λ λ
λ
α λ αθ λ λ
+ +
+
+ + +
⋅ − −
− = + ⋅ ⋅
− ⋅ − ⋅⋅ −
  
          



. (20a) 
 Equation (21a) illustrates the fact that the labor purchases by old lenders are a function of λ , 
but also of 
1t
K
+
. However, the latter is inelastic and independent of λ , since it was chosen before the 
realization of the latter. Interestingly, ( )
1t
L λ
+
  is a key indicator of the welfare of old lenders, since it 
                                                          
72 ( )
1t
L λ
+
  is undefined and discontinuous when 
1t
K xα
+
= ⋅ , since 
( )
1
lim
t
K xα
−
+
→ ⋅
= ∞  and 
( )
1
lim
t
K xα
+
+
→ ⋅
= −∞ . 
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represents their ability to produce their final good, for a given 
1t
K
+
. The following proposition 
illustrates the changes in the old lenders’ welfare when facing an innovation in λ . 
 Proposition 1 An innovation in λ  reduces the ability of old lenders of purchasing labor by 
reducing their resources available. The latter also reduces their ability of producing their final good, 
thus reducing its supply in equilibrium. 
 Proof: After differentiating (20a) with respect to λ  and an extensive rearrangement of terms, 
one obtains 
( )
( ) ( )
1
1
1
2
0
1 2
t H
H L t
q LdL
d K q L
α
α α
λ λ
λ α θ λ λ
+
+
+
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −
= − <
− ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅  


, (20b) 
which indicates that the lender’s purchases of labor fall in the face of an innovation of λ . 
 Second, the total production of the final good 
1
1t
Y K L
α α−
+
= ⋅  depends on both capital and labor 
purchases. At the time when an innovation of λ  is observed, K  is inelastic, and only L  will respond 
to this change. Thus, differentiating 
1t
Y
+
 with respect to λ  yields 
( )1 1 0t
dY dL
K L
d d
α α
α
λ λ
−
+ = − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ <
 
.  (20c) 
 Of course, the latter implies a reduction of total output in the presence of an innovation of the 
cut-off value of the shock. 
Q.E.D. 
The Welfare of Old Borrowers 
 In a symmetric general equilibrium, the following basic conditions illustrate important 
properties that are consistent with the contingent plan of action that borrowers formulated when 
young: 
( ) ( )1
2, 1 2, 1
1
1
0t
t t
t
w K
c c
L
α
α
α
λ
θ
+
+ +
+
− ⋅
= = = >  , (21a) 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1
2, 1 1 2, 1
1
t t
t t t
t
q
c c
λ λ
λ λ
θ
+ +
+ + +
+
⋅ −
− =

   , (21b) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 11
2, 1 1
1 1 1
1
0t t t tt
t t
t t t
q qw K
c
L
α
α
λ λ λ λα
λ
θ θ θ
+ + + ++
+ +
+ + +
− ⋅ − ⋅− ⋅
= + = + >
 
 . (21c) 
 First, equation (21a) indicates that the marginal old borrower –who experiences the realization 
1t
λ λ
+
=  - is indifferent between defaulting and repaying her debt. Second, condition (21b) illustrates 
two facts. On the one hand, an old borrower who experiences realizations such that )
1
,
t L
λ λ λ
+
∈ 
  will 
be worse-off than defaulting if she chooses to repay her debt since ( ) ( )
2, 1 1 1 1t t t t
c wλ θ
+ + + +
<
 . On the 
other hand, an old borrower who experiences realizations such that (
1
,
t H
λ λ λ
+
∈ 
  will find it in her 
best interest to repay her debt, since ( ) ( )
2, 1 1 1 1t t t t
c wλ θ
+ + + +
>
 . Equation (21c) describes the 
consumption of an old borrower who chooses to repay her debt. It is thus apparent that when 
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)
1
,
t L
λ λ λ
+
∈ 
  obtains, the old borrower will choose to default on her debt and she will consume 
( )
2, 1 1 1t t t
c w θ
+ + +
=
 , while when (
1
,
t H
λ λ λ
+
∈ 
  obtains, the borrower will choose to repay her debt and 
she will consume ( ) ( ) ( )
2, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2, 1t t t t t t t t
c w q cλ θ λ λ θ
+ + + + + + + +
= + ⋅ − >  
   . 
I now turn to the analysis of the effects of an innovation of λ , which are described in the 
following proposition. 
 Proposition 2 An innovation in λ  affects the welfare of the two groups of old borrowers 
differently: it makes the borrowers who chose to default on their debt better-off, while the borrowers 
who chose to repay their debt worse-off. However, the group of old borrowers as a whole are made 
worse-off by the increase in λ . Moreover, the number of borrowers in the first group increases, while 
the number of borrowers in the second group decreases. 
 Proof: I start with the consumption of borrowers who choose to default in equilibrium. By 
differentiating (21a) with respect to λ , one obtains 
( )2 , 1
1
1
0t
dc K dL
d dL
α
α
α α
λ λ
+
+
⋅ − ⋅
= − ⋅ >

 
. (21d) 
 Equation (21d) indicates that old borrowers who choose to default are made better-off by an 
innovation in λ . The fraction of borrowers who default, given by ( ) ( )
L H L
λ λ λ λ− − , increases with 
λ , which is consistent with the increase observed in 
2, 1t
c
+
 . 
 Regarding the consumption of borrowers who choose to repay their debt, one must 
differentiate equation (21c) with respect to λ . By doing so, one obtains 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 , 1 1
2
1 1 1
1 1 1
2 1
0
2
t t t t H L t
t t H L t
dc
d
q K q L
K q L
αα
α α
λ θ
λ θ
α λ α λ λ
θ λ λ
+ + + + +
+ + +
⋅
=
⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ + − ⋅
<
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅
  
 
 



. (21e) 
 Interestingly, equation (21e) indicates that an innovation in λ  causes the old borrowers who 
chose to repay their debt to be worse-off. Finally, the fraction of borrowers who choose to repay their 
debt, given by ( ) ( )
H H L
λ λ λ λ− − , decreases with λ . The latter is consistent with the reduction in 
2, 1t
c
+
 . These two effects continue until ( ) ( )
2, 1 1 1t t t
c wλ θ
+ + +
′′ =
  , where λ′  is the new cut-off value of 
the shock. 
 I now turn to analyze the aggregate welfare of borrowers, given by ( )
1 1t t
m θ
+ +
  in the equation 
below. 
( )
( )
11 1 1
1
1 1 1
H
tt t t
t
t t t H L
m w q
d
λ
λ
λ λ
λ
θ θ θ λ λ
++ + +
+
+ + +
−
= + ⋅ ⋅
−
 
  
 
∫

 
. (21f) 
 After some non-trivial effort, I was able to show that 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
1 11 1
1
1 1 1
2 1
0
2
t H L tt t
t H
t H L t H L t
K q Ld m
q
d K q L
α α
α α
θ λ λ αθ
λ λ
λ θ λ λ θ λ λ
+ ++ +
+
+ + +
⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅
= ⋅ − <
⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅
     
 
    



, (21g) 
which indicates that the aggregate welfare of old borrowers is reduced by an innovation in λ . 
Q.E.D. 
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 Interestingly, Proposition 3 illustrates the fact that, in the time of a mortgage crisis, the 
borrowers who choose to default experience welfare gains, while the “honest” borrowers will be made 
worse-off. Moreover, the losses experienced by the “honest” borrowers dominate, making the 
borrowers as a group worse-off. This result is the more appealing when one confronts the 
conventional wisdom around the subprime mortgage crisis, where a case is being made to attempt to 
improve the conditions faced by the borrowers who have been forced to default on their mortgages. It 
would appear that, instead, the case shall be made to help those who are trying to repair their 
mortgages, not the ones who defaulted. 
The Welfare of Old Lenders 
 Now I am in a position to analyze the welfare of the old lenders in equilibrium. A lender’s 
welfare depends on her consumption of the final good she produces, 
2, 1t
l
+
. In turn, following equation 
(3a), it transpires that the lenders’ consumption depends on both the amount produced of the good and 
the consumption of the old borrowers. The proposition below presents some very provoking results 
that involve the lenders’ welfare. 
 Proposition 3 The old lenders experience welfare gains, after a mortgage crisis in the form of 
an innovation in λ  has obtained. 
 Proof: After imposing the general equilibrium conditions in equation (3a) and differentiating 
with respect to λ , it transpires that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
2, 1 1 1
1 1 1
2 1
0
2
t t H L H t H
t H L t H L t
dl K L q L
d K q L
α α
α α
θ λ λ λ λ α λ λ
λ θ λ λ θ λ λ
+ + +
+ + +
⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − − + ⋅ − ⋅
= >
⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅  
 

. (22a) 
 The former equation indicates that an innovation in λ  increases the old lenders’ consumption 
in equilibrium. The latter, of course, will result in a welfare gain for these agents. 
Q.E.D. 
 The expression in (22a) indicates that, contrary to what one expect, the lenders’ welfare 
improves in the time of a crisis originated by an innovations in the cut-off value of the shock. Given 
the circumstances, one would tend to look first at the reduction of output as one factor that would 
undermine the lenders’ welfare. However, the reduction in the borrowers’ welfare dominates this 
effect. Thus, the old lenders are made better-off at the expense of the old borrowers’. 
The Welfare of the Bank 
 The welfare of the different individual banks is directly related to their profits, which take the 
form of purchases of labor when old, 
1t
a
+
. After imposing the general equilibrium conditions on 
(14c), one obtains the following expression 
( ) ( )
1t
a κ λ ξ λ
+
= −  , (23a) 
 Where ( )κ λ  represents the bank’s income/revenue function and ( )ξ λ  denotes the bank’s 
cost function. I proceed now by analyzing each of these functions separately, at first. 
 Properties of the Bank’s Revenue Function. The revenue function in a general equilibrium 
is given by 
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
11 1
1 1 1 1
ˆ 1
2 2
H t tt t L t
t t t t
q yq q
w w w w
λ λ ρλ χ λ
λκ ++ +
+ + + +
− ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −⋅ ⋅
≡ + + −
⋅ ⋅

  (23b) 
 The evaluation of the revenue function at the extreme values of the distribution of λ  provides 
interesting insight. I start by evaluating the revenue function at 0
L
λ λ= ≤  
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( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2
1
1 1 1
0 0
1
t t t t t H Lt L t
t t t
p b p L K b pp x K q
w w w
φ α λ λφ λ
α
κ +
+ + +
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −⋅ ⋅ − ⋅
= − − − <
−
. (23c) 
 Thus, the bank would receive negative revenue for values of λ  that are sufficiently low. 
However, ( )λκ   increases as λ  continues to increase, as one can deduct from the following 
expression 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 1
1 1
1
ˆ 2 1
0t t t H t
t tH
t
R p b p qd
d w w
λ λκ λ
λ λ λ
+ +
+ +
+
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − +
= − >
−
 
 ⋅
  

 
. (23d) 
 It is easy to figure out from (23d) that ( )
0
0
d
d λ
κ λ
λ =
>



 although 
( )
lim
H
d
dλ λ
κ λ
λ→
= ∞



. In the limit, it 
transpires that ( ) ( )2 2 1 1 1 02H H L t t t tq w wλκ λ λ χ+ + += + > − ⋅ ⋅    holds. In summary, the bank’s 
revenue function is an increasing and convex function of λ  which happens to be negative for low 
enough values of its argument. 
 Properties of the Bank’s Cost Function. The bank’s cost function in a general equilibrium 
has the following form 
( )
( ) ( )
1 11 1 1 1
1 1 1
ˆˆ ˆ
0t t t tt t t t t
t t t
R p b pR p d R p x K
w w w
λξ + ++ + + +
+ + +
⋅ ⋅⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −
≡ = − > . (24a) 
 Equation (24a) indicates that there are two forces at play in the cost function: the effect that 
increases the interest rate on deposits has as λ  increases, and the effect that reduces the deposits 
under the same conditions. The latter is apparent from73 
( ) ( ) ( )1
1 1 1
ˆ
ˆt tt
t t t t t
d b pdRd
p x K b p R p
d d d
ξ λ
λ λ λ
+
+ + +
= ⋅ ⋅ − − − ⋅ ⋅
  
            

  
.  (24b) 
 It is the case that, in equilibrium, the costs are increasing in λ  for values of λ  that are low 
enough, while they decrease for higher values of λ . Moreover, ( )2 2 0d dλ λξ <   holds, indicating 
that costs are a strictly concave function of the cut-off value of the shock. 
 Properties of the Bank’s Profits. The diagram below will help us understand the behavior of 
1t
a
+
 by illustrating together the behavior of revenue and costs as a function of λ . 
                                                          
73 See the following sections for details on 
1
ˆ
t
R
+
, 
1
ˆ
t
ρ
+
 and ( )
t t
b p . 
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 Now, I restrict my attention to the analysis of the equilibria that have economic meaning, as 
described in the following proposition. 
 Proposition 4 Equilibria can only exist in the range 
*
,
H
λ λ λ∈   
  , where profits are positive. 
 Proof: In this model, the bank uses her profits to purchase labor. Since one cannot purchase 
negative amounts of labor, and because the bank has no supply of labor to offer when old74, we can 
rule out equilibria where )*,
L
λ λ λ∈ 
   and 
1
0
t
a
+
< . Thus, equilibria will exist only for allocations 
where 
*
,
H
λ λ λ∈   
   and 
1
0
t
a
+
≥  hold. 
Q.E.D. 
 In this model, even though banks are local monopolies, they are vulnerable to the presence of 
allocations where operation is not economically viable. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the banks 
will prefer allocations associated with higher rates of default and risk, since only there can they expect 
to make a profit and remain open to the public. Allocations where )*,
L
λ λ λ∈ 
   can also be interpreted 
as equilibria in which financial autarky is present and the market for mortgages does not operate. In 
the latter case, though, the market for IOUs could still be operative. One can then say that, in this 
model economy, banks are slaves to risk and conscious risk-takers in equilibrium. However, there is a 
double edge to this statement, since in the limit, when 
H
λ λ= , there is universal default and banks 
could not subsist either since deposits would be close to zero. 
The Amount Issued of IOUs 
 The real value of the IOUs issued and its properties will indicate the direction of the strategic 
interaction present in equilibrium in this economy. I proceed by first combining equations (11a), (16a) 
and (16b) and imposing an interior solution for both ( )
t t
b p  and λ . Then, one obtains the following 
expression, which defines the function ( )t
t
b
p
λ  implicitly: 
                                                          
74 One could think as well of the possibility of endowing old banks with labor when old, but this seems to 
complicate matters greatly without the corresponding gain in insight. 
λ
H
λLλ
( )λκ ( ),λκ 
( )λξ 
( )λξ 
*
λ
1t
a
+
Figure 4: The Bank’s Revenue, Costs and Profits 
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( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1
ˆ
ˆˆln 1
ˆ
ˆˆln 1
t t t t
t H t t t t t
t t t
t t t
t t t t t t
t t
b R p b
w q q y R p
p q p
R p b
w q q y R p
q p
λ
λ λ ρ λ λ λ
λ
λ ρ λ λ λ
−
+ +
+ + + + +
+
+ +
+ + + + +
+
⋅
= ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅
⋅
− ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅
         
        
     
    

   

   
. (25a) 
 Equation (21) a second order, nonlinear equation in ( )t
t
b
p
λ , in which λ  also appears in the 
denominator of 
1
ˆ
t
R
+
. On the first hand, if, in equilibrium, it is observed that ( )
t t
b p  increases with 
λ , it will indicate the presence of strategic complementarities. On the other hand, if ( )
t t
b p  
decreases with λ , strategic substitutability dominates in equilibrium. Given the complex nature of the 
expression in (25a), it is not clear at first sight whether the IOUs issued are increasing or decreasing in 
λ . The following proposition illustrates the results. 
 Proposition 5 ( )t tb p  is increasing in the cut-off value of the shock, λ , over the interval 
( ),
L M
λ λ , where 
M
λ  is such that ( ) 1
1
t t
M
t t
b w
p
λ
θ
+
+
= . 
 Proof:  
 a) Boundaries for the domain of ( )
t t
b p . First, ( )t
L
t
b
p
λ  does not exist75. Second, 
( ) ( )
1 1t t t t
b p w θ
+ +
=  does not obtain in equilibrium. Two reasons explain the latter. First, the 
lenders’ investment into capital must be strictly positive, and second, lenders will realize that 
borrowers will not have any resources left to repay their mortgages, thus defaulting both on mortgages 
and the IOUs. 
 b) After excruciating pain and suffering, I was able to find that76 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1
3
2t t
d b p A
d A
Aλ
λ λ
λ
=
+
 

 (25b) 
 where I have assumed that 0dL dλ = , to fix ideas. Moreover, one observes that 
( ) 0
t t
d b p dλ >  everywhere but on the interval 
1 2
,λ λ   , where 1 21 , Hλ λ λ< <  and ( ) 0t td b p dλ < . 
Thus, there is an interval 
1 3
,λ λ   , for 2 3 Hλ λ λ< < , where more than one equilibria can exist, in the 
sense that the same value ( ) 0b p >  transpires for more than one value of λ . Graphical analysis 
indicates that at most three equilibria can obtain. 
Q.E.D. 
 The previous result is very interesting. It implies that, in general, when λ  is higher, the young 
borrowers know that there will be a higher rate of default in the following date, and thus choose to 
                                                          
75 See details in section 2 of the Technical Appendix. 
76 See the Technical Appendix for details on this proof. 
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borrow more, since they will very likely choose not repay it. Thus, the equilibrium in this model 
economy has the potential for strategic complementarities, which could lead to the presence of 
multiple equilibria, as it is the case in the interval 
1 3
,λ λ   . However, I must point out that there is a 
limit to this effect, since values of λ  such that 
M
λ λ≥  do not obtain in equilibrium. I must also point 
out that the amount issued of IOUs increases at the expense of deposits, which are perfect substitutes 
from the standpoint of the lenders. 
 
 
 
The Interest Rate on Deposits and IOUs 
 The interest rates play a very important role in defining the properties of the equilibrium in 
this model. I start by discussing the properties of the interest rate on deposits and IOUs. These two 
interest rates are equal in equilibrium because there is no arbitrage in rates of return on assets that are 
perfect substitutes. In addition, the return on both deposits and IOUs represent a significant source of 
income to old lenders. After imposing equilibrium conditions on (16a), one obtains the following 
expression 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
11 1
1
ˆ ˆ 0t H L
t t
t H
L
R r
p K
α
α
α θ λ λ
λ λ
λ λ
−
+
−+ +
+
⋅ ⋅ −
= = ⋅ >
⋅ −
 
 
  
 

. (26a) 
 The reader may notice that, at date 1t + , 
1t
K
+
 is independent of λ , since it was determined 
before the shocks are realized. However, this is not the case for 
1t
L
+
, which is affected by the default 
of borrowers. One could alternatively regard the interest rate loan in terms of the return on capital, 
which is a perfect substitute to both deposits and IOUs. Let ( )
1 1 1t t t
k K L
+ + +
≡  denote the capital-labor 
ratio and ( )
1t
k
+
Ψ  denote the marginal product of capital. Then, the equilibrium interest rate on 
deposits can also be expressed as ( ) ( ) ( ) 1
1 1 1
ˆ 1
t t t
R kλ θ π
−
+ + +
= ⋅ Ψ ⋅ − , implying that there is no 
arbitrage among the returns of all the assets available to young lenders. 
L
λ
H
λ λ
( )
t t
b p
( )w θ
M
λ
1
λ
2
λ
3
λ
( )b p
Figure 5: The Amount Issued of IOUs and Multiple Equilibria 
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 Proposition 6 The equilibrium interest rate on deposits and IOUs 
1
ˆ
t
R
+
 is nonlinear and 
convex function of λ . In particular, 
1
ˆ
t
R
+
 is decreasing over the interval ),
L R
λ λ  and decreasing when 
( ,
R H
λ λ λ∈ 
 , where 
R
λ  is such that 
1
ˆ 0
R
t
dR d
λ λ
λ
+ =
=

 . Moreover, this interest rate grows without 
upper bound as λ  grows closer to 
H
λ . 
 Proof: Differentiating (26a) with respect to λ  yields 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
1 1
1
1
ˆ 1t t H L
t H H
dR L dL L
d dp K
α α
α
α θ λ λ α
λ λλ λ λ λ
− −
+ +
−
+
⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅
⋅ +
⋅ − −
=
         
       
  
. (26b) 
 The first term inside of the curly brackets in (26b) is negative and decreasing in λ , while the 
second term is positive and increasing in λ . It is apparent, then, that there exists a value 
( )** ,
L H
λ λ λ∈ , such that ( )**
1
ˆ 0
t
dR dλ λ
+
=  obtains. Moreover, it transpires that ( )
1 1
ˆˆ 0
t
dR dλ λ
+
<  for 
**
1
λˆ λ∀ < , while ( )
1 2
ˆˆ 0
t
dR dλ λ
+
>  for 
**
2
λˆ λ∀ > . 
 Secondly, after evaluating (20a) at 
H
λ λ= , one obtains 
( ) ( )
1 1
ˆlim
H
H L
t t
H
R k
λ λ
λ λ
λ θ
λ λ+ +→
−
= ⋅ Ψ ⋅ = ∞
−
 
 
 
 


 , (26c) 
 which proves the second part of this proposition. 
Q.E.D. 
  Proposition 6 indicates that there may be two equilibria for a given fixed value of the interest 
rate on deposits 0R > , as illustrated in Figure 6 below. On the one hand, the value 
1
λˆ  corresponds to 
an equilibrium where the interest rate is R  and there is a low rate of default. On the other hand, the 
value 
2
λˆ  is associated with an equilibrium where the interest rate is also equal to R , but there is a high 
rate of default instead. 
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The Interest Rate on Mortgages 
 The equilibrium interest rate on mortgages 
1
ˆ
t
ρ
+
 plays a twofold role in this model. First, it is 
one of the key factors that affect the decision by borrowers of whether to default or not in equilibrium. 
Second, it represents the main source of income for the old bank, thus affecting her profit and the 
amount of labor services 
1t
a
+
 that she will be able to purchase and consume. After imposing the 
equilibrium conditions on (16b), one obtains the following expression for the interest rate on 
mortgages: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
1 1
11
ˆ
1 1
t tt t H L
t
t Ht
b p Lq
q y q y K
α
α
λ
λ α θ λ λ
ρ λ
λ
−
+ +
−+
⋅⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −
= −
⋅ − −⋅ − ⋅
 
 
  



.  (27a) 
 It is apparent from (27a) that 
1
ˆ
t
ρ
+
 is a somewhat complex function of λ , making the analysis 
of its properties a bit complicated. Given the latter, I thus proceed by using a modified version of my 
fixed-point technique. I present the results in the following proposition. 
 Proposition 7 The following are properties of 
1
ˆ
t
ρ
+
 in equilibrium: 
1. ( )
1
ˆ 0
t
ρ λ
+
≥  is a smooth, nonlinear function of λ , such that ( )
1
0ˆ
t
d dρ λ
+
>  for 
*
λ λ< , and 
( )
1
ˆ 0
t
d dρ λ
+
<  for 
*
λ λ> . Moreover, ( )2 2
1
ˆ 0
t
dd ρ λ
+
< , ,
L H
λ λ λ∀ ∈   
 . 
2. An interest rate on mortgages with meaningful economic content –i.e. ( )
1
ˆ 0
t
ρ λ
+
≥ - in this 
model exists only for the range 
1 2
,λ λ  
   of its domain, where 
1 L
λ λ>  and 
2 H
λ λ<  are such that 
( ) ( )
1 1 1 2
ˆ ˆ 0
t t
ρ λ ρ λ
+ +
= =  . 
 Proof: 
 Part 1: After differentiating equation (27a) with respect to λ , one obtains the expression 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 1
2 2
ˆ 1
1
t t t tt t
H t t
t
H H
B b p L d b pd q dL B L
b p
d q y d d
α ααρ
λ λ
λ λ λλ λ λ λ
−
−
+ +
⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
= − ⋅ − − ⋅ +
⋅ − − −
   
   
     

   
 (27b) 
 where 
( )
( )
1
1
0
1
t H L
t
B
q y K
α
α θ λ λ
+
−
⋅ ⋅ −
≡ >
⋅ − ⋅
. It is apparent that the first term on the right hand side of 
(27b) is strictly positive and decreasing in λ , while the second term is strictly negative and nonlinear 
in λ . Thus, there exists a value of λ , that I will denote by 
*
λ , such that ( )*ˆ 0d dρ λ λ = . Moreover, 
( )
1
0ˆ
t
d dρ λ
+
>  holds for 
*
λ λ< , while ( )
1
ˆ 0
t
d dρ λ
+
<  for 
*
λ λ> . All of the above implies that 
( )2 2
1
ˆ 0
t
dd ρ λ
+
<  holds77, ,
L H
λ λ λ∀ ∈   
 . 
 Part 2: There exist two values of λ  that I will denote by 
1
λ  and 
2
λ , such that 
( ) ( )
1 2
ˆ ˆ 0ρ λ ρ λ= =  , where 
1 2 HL
λ λ λ λ<≤ ≤  . Given the proof of part 1 of this proposition, it follows 
directly that ( )ˆ 0ρ λ >  for all ( )
1 2
,λ λ λ∈   . 
                                                          
77 This proof is available upon request. 
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Q.E.D. 
 It follows, from Proposition 7, that there exist two equilibria for a fixed real interest rate on 
loans ρ , as indicated by Figure 7 below. The first equilibrium is associated with 
*
1
λ , indicating the 
low rate of default ( )* *
1 1 H L
π λ λ λ= − . On the contrary, the second equilibrium has the cut-off value 
*
2
λ , indicating the high rate of default ( )* *
2 2 H L
π λ λ λ= − .78 
 I must point out that the latter results are consistent with the equilibrium properties of 
1
ˆ
t
R
+
 
that I described in Proposition 6. Thus, this economy has the potential for multiple equilibria, which is 
explained mostly from the fact that strategic complementarities are present in this model economy. 
One, however, must still be careful when making statements about the number of equilibria in this 
economy due to the properties of the bank’s profits in equilibrium. The latter rule out a set of low 
enough values of λ  for which the bank’s profits are negative. 
 
 
Preliminary Conclusions79 
 The main properties obtained from my model so far are: 
1. There is always a positive rate of default in equilibrium, whether it is unique or not. 
Moreover, universal default and universal repayment cannot obtain in equilibrium due to the 
nature of the shock that continuously hits this economy and the signaling to lenders by borrowers, 
respectively. 
2. The equilibrium interest rates on deposits, IOUs and loans display the potential for the 
existence of two equilibria: one with a low rate of default and the other with a high rate of default. 
However, the model so far has not produced any criteria for equilibrium selection yet. 
3. Contrary to standard intuition, the monopolistic banks obtains positive profits only when the 
equilibrium rates of default are sufficiently high; my interpretation of this result is that banks are 
risk lovers in equilibrium. 
4. In this model, young borrowers formulate a contingent plan in light of the realization of the 
shock that they will experience the following period. This works through the choice of a cut-off 
                                                          
78 Of course, 
* *
1 2
π π<  obtains. 
79 I apologize for the lack of flow in my writing, but it is mostly due to my time constraint. 
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value from the distribution of the shock, such that realizations below the cut-off will lead to 
defaulting while realizations above the cut-off will lead to repayment. 
5. A crisis in this model takes the form of an innovation in the cut-off value of the shock. 
6. A crisis reduces total output in this economy by reducing the resources available to purchase 
labor. Thus, one would expect the GDP to fall in a time of crisis. 
7. A crisis also reduces the aggregate welfare of borrowers. However, this effect can be 
misleading, since the borrowers who default experience welfare gains, while the “honest” 
borrowers who choose to repay their debt are made worse-off. Thus, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, these result shows that the borrowers who default do not suffer from this shock and that 
the ones who are in the need of help, probably from government agencies, are the “honest” 
borrowers. 
8. The lenders in this economy (equivalent to the general public who holds deposits on banks) 
experience significant welfare gains as a result of a crisis. This, then, is another sector that is not 
in need of government assistance. 
9. A crisis increases the bank’s income but reduces its costs, thus increasing the bank’s profits in 
equilibrium. This result seems to go against conventional wisdom, but remember that there are 
no investment banks in this model nor mortgage backed securities. This is consistent with the 
fact that commercial banks seem to be doing reasonable well in light of the subprime mortgage 
crisis. 
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